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HOW THE STATES GOVERN THE NEWS
MEDIA - A SURVEY OF SELECTED
JURISDICTIONS
Jon H. Sylvester·
The first amendment to the Constitution of tht~ United States pro-
vides, in part, that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the free-
dom ... of the press." This freedom, however, was not defined by the
framers of the Constitution and, because the fourteenth amendment
makes this prohibition equally applicable to the states, this task has
fallen, to a great extent, to the legislatures and courts of individual states.
Despite the absolute language of the amendment, none of these bodies
has interpreted freedom of the press to be absolute. The media, particu-
larly the news media, have repeatedly and continuously challenged what
they regard as attempts to restrict the exercise of their constitutionally
guaranteed freedom.
Section Two of Article III of the Constitution provides for United
States Supreme Court jurisdiction over all cases arising under the Consti-
tution. Therefore, state laws impacting upon the operation of the press
must, when challenged, pass constitutional muster. Most legal questions
involving the press, however, are decided by state courts applying state
law. This article surveys and compares the laws of selected jurisdictions
on several topics as they impact upon the operations of the print and
broadcast media.
Specifically, this article examines the statutory and decisional law of
California, the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, New York and
Texas to determine the similarities and differences of their laws regarding
defamation, invasion of privacy, cameras in the courtroom, shield laws
(reporter's privilege), broadcast of recorded conversations, publication of
• The author, formerly a professional journalist, is a graduate of the Harvard Law School and
an Assistant Professor of Law at Texas Southern University in Houston. He gratefully acknowl-
edges the capable research assistance of Ms. Carlette D. Moore and the technical assistance of Ms.
Doris Frank.
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pilfered documents, open records legislation, and open meetings
legislation.
These jurisdictions were chosen because of geographical distribu-
tion, differing lengths of common law tradition, variety of principle eco-
nomic activity, and because each contains at least (or, in the case of the
District of Columbia, is) one of the country's major (top 10) broadcast
markets.
I. DEFAMATION
Media organizations often find themselves on the defensive as
targets of lawsuits based on allegations that defamatory statements have
been printed or broadcast. These suits frequently involve multi-million
dollar damage claims. Perhaps more importantly, the cost of even a suc-
cessful defense could bankrupt most small publishers and broadcasters.
Thus, most ominous among those laws impacting on media operations
are the laws related to defamation. Defamation is generally defined as
"that which tends to injure reputation, to diminish the esteem, respect,
goodwill or confidence in which the plaintiff is held, or to excite adverse,
derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions against him."1 Included
within defamation are libel and slander. Generally, libel is written defa-
mation and slander is oral defamation. The law of defamation seeks to
balance the individual's right to his or her reputation and the media's
right not to be intimidated by baseless (but costly) legal actions, or undue
fear of accidental liability.
Each jurisdiction has laws (common, statutory, or both) governing
libel and slander. These laws are more alike than they are different be-
cause the Supreme Court of the United States has been especially specific
in establishing parameters within which state defamation law must
operate.
Since 1964, the media have been afforded a qualified privilege in def-
amation actions brought by public officials. In New York Times v. Sulli-
van,2 the Supreme Court of the United States set the standard for a
successful defamation action by a public official against a media defend-
ant. A public official in such an action must allege and prove that a
defamatory publication was made with "actual malice."3 "Actual mal-
ice" is defined as "knowledge that [the publication] was false or ... reck-
less disregard of whether it was false or not."4 To prove actual malice
I. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 375 (5th ed. 1979).
2. 376 U.s. 254 (1964).
3. Id. at 280.
4. Id.
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the plaintiff must show that the "defendant[s] entertained serious
doubts5 as to the truth of [the] publication."6
Sullivan was expanded to include public figures in Gertz v. Welch
Inc. 7 The Gertz Court recognized two possible classifications of public
figures: (1) persons who "occupy positions of such persuasive power and
influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes,,,g or "by
reason of their their fame shape events in areas of concern to society at
large;"9 and (2) persons who "have thrust themselves to the forefront of
particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of is-
sues involved."10 All the jurisdictions surveyed endorse these basic prin-
ciples. II There are distinctions, however, in the application of these
principles. For example, some jurisdictions have expanded upon the defi-
nition of public official. California courts interpreted the Gertz definition
of public figure to further require that "the plaintiff must have volunta-
rily and actively sought, in connection with any giv,en matter of public
interest, to influence the resolution of the issues involved,"12 and his or
her position "must be one which would invite public scrutiny and discus-
sion occasioned by the particular charges in controversy."13 In Rancho
La Costa, Inc., v. Superior Court, County of Los Angeles, 14 the court
called this the "public controversy test." 15
In the District of Columbia, the "voluntariness" of plaintiff's notori-
ety is not pivotal, but "a person can be a general public figure only if he is
a 'celebrity,' his name a 'household word' whose ideas and actions the
public in fact follows with great interest."16 Texas has also endorsed this
definition. 17 In both the District of Columbia and Texas, a person is a
limited public figure "if he is attempting to have, or realistically can be
5. Garrison v. Louisana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
6. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
7. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
8. Id. at 345.
9. Id. at 337 (quoting Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967».
10. Id. at 345.
11. Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publication, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1980), (using
District of Columbia law) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980); Yiamougianni's v. Consumers Union,
619 F.2d 932 (2d Cir.) (using New York law), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980); Lyons v. New Mass
Media, Inc., 390 Mass. 51, 55-56,453 N.E.2d 451, 455-56 (1983); Foster v. Laredo Newspaper, Inc.,
541 S.W.2d 809, 819 (Tex.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1976).
12. Franklin v. Benevolent Order of Elks, 97 Cal. App. 3d 915, 929, 159 Cal. Rptr. 131, 140
(1979).
13. Id.
14. 106 Cal. App. 3d 646, 659, 165 Cal. Rptr. 347, 355 (1980).
15. Id. at 660, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
16. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1292.
17. Durham v. Cannon Communications, Inc., 645 S.W.2d 845, 849 (Tex. App. 1982) (quoting
Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1292).
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expected to have, a major impact on the resolution of a specific public
dispute that has foreseeable and substantial ramifications for persons be-
yond its immediate participants." 18 Massachusetts similarly defined pub-
lic figure in Stone v. County Newspaper, Inc. 19
If a defamation action is brought by a private individual against a
media defendant, the standard to be applied is to be defined by the states,
"so long as they do not impose liability without fault."20 Subject only to
this limitation, each jurisdiction is responsible for establishing its own
standards for defamation actions brought by private individuals against
media defendants.
The basic standard adopted in accordance with Gertz is that of sim-
ple negligence.21 New York, however, has adopted a stricter standard.
The plaintiff must show that "the publisher acted in a grossly irresponsi-
ble manner without due consideration for the standards of information
gathering and dissemination ordinarily followed by responsible par-
ties.'>22 Where a private individual proves liability by simple negligence,
he is generally entitled to recover actual damages.23 Special damages
may be recovered if pled, but punitive damages are expressly
prohibited.24
Expressions of opinion are absolutely protected by the first amend-
ment, irrespective of the defamatory nature of the statements.25 Each
juridiction surveyed is in agreement with this general principle.26 In
New York, the definition of a statement of opinion is somewhat more
qualified. Constitutional protection is not afforded statements of opinion
which convey the clear implication of underlying facts that would con-
firm the opinion, but are unknown to the reader or listener.27
In each jurisdiction surveyed, members of the news media have a
qualified privilege, either by statute or by case law, to make fair comment
18. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1292; Durham, 645 S.W.2d at 850.
19. 367 Mass. 849, 866-67, 330 N.E.2d 161, 172-73 (1975).
20. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347.
21. See, e.g.. Outlet Co. v. Intern Security Group, 693 S.W.2d 621, 626 (Tex. App. 1984);
Stone, 367 Mass. at 858, 330 N.E.2d at 167.
22. Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 199,341 N.E.2d 569, 571, 379
N.Y.S.2d 61, 64 (1975).
23. Stone, 367 Mass. at 861, 330 N.E.2d at 169.
24. Outlet Co.. 693 S.W.2d at 626.
25. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40.
26. Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 883, 893 (2d Cir. 1976), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977);
Oilman v. Evans, 479 F. Supp. 292-93, (D.C. Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 713 F.2d 838 (D.C.
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2662 (1985); Carr v. Warden, 159 Cal. App. 3d 1166, 1170, 206
Cal. Rptr. 162, 164 (1984).
27. Hutchner V. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 913 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977).
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or criticism ofjudicial, legislative or official public proceedings or of any-
thing said in such proceedings.28 The privilege of fair comment is re-
stricted to true reporting. In addition, Massachusetts courts have held
that the privilege is lost where it is shown that the remarks were made
with actual malice.29 The privilege in Texas extends only to fair com-
ment or criticism; false statements of fact are not protected by the quali-
fied privilege and are actionable.30
The media are frequently means by which defamatory statements
are republished, even though the republishing medium may not actually
be responsible for the original publication. In this situation liability is
not usually imposed by California courts, unless the publisher had reason
to believe the publication was libelous.3 ! In Appleby v. Daily Hampshire
Gazette, 32 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that liability
will not lie where the newspaper publisher exercises due care and relies
on the accuracy of a story received from a reputable news wire service,
even though there was no independant verification of the story before
publication.33 Appleby is an exception to the general rule that publica-
tion of a defamatory statement subjects the republisher to liability as if he
had originally published the defamatory statement. 34
A. Statutory Defamation Provisions Relating To The Media
All of the jurisdictions surveyed, except the District of Columbia,
have statutory defamation provisions that specificaHy address the news
media. California provides the most extensive coverage. Massachusetts
and Texas have enacted retraction provisions which permit the retraction
or correction of a defamatory statement to be considt:red in mitigation of
damages, provided such retraction or correction is done within a reason-
able time after publication of the defamatory statement. 35
28. Hoffman v. Washington Post, Co., 433 F. Supp. 600, 603 (D.D.C. 1977); see also. Kilgore v.
Younger, 30 Cal. 3d 770, 640 P.2d 793, 180 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1982); Lyons. 390 Mass. at 51, 453
N.E.2d at 457; Schneph v. N. Y. Times, 36 Misc. 2d 456, 223 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1961); Frank B. Hall &
Co. v. Buck, 678 S.W.2d 612, 622 (Tex. 1984); CAL. CIV. CODE § 47 (West 1982); TEX. CIV. CODE
ANN. § 73.002(a), (b)(I)(A) (Vernon 1985); N. Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 74 (McKinney 1976).
29. Seelig v. Harvard Cooperative Soc., 246 N.E.2d 642,646-47 (Mass. 1969); See also, Rancho
La Costa. Inc.• 106 Cal. ApI'. 3d at 664, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 358-59 (proof of malice will defeat
privilege).
30. Bell Publishing Co. v. Garrett Eng'g Co., 141 Tex. 51, 62-63, 170 S.W.2d 197, 204-05
(1943).
31. Osmond v. EWAP, Inc., 153 Cal. ApI'. 3d 842, 852, 200 Cal. Rptr. 674, 680 (1980).
32. 395 Mass. 32,478 N.E.2d 721 (1985).
33. Id. at 725.
34. Id. at 724. See also, Ingber v. Ross, 479 A.2d 1256, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
35. MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231 § 93 (West 1985); TEX. CIV. CODE ANN. § 73.003(a)(3)
(Vernon 1986).
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California prohibits the recovery of all but special damages in a def-
amation action against a newspaper or radio station, unless the plaintiff
shows that he or she gave the newspaper or radio station notice of the
libelous or slanderous matter and made a demand for correction within
twenty days after plaintiff's first knowledge of the publication or .broad-
cast of the allegedly defamatory matter, and that such correction was not
made. 36 In order to recover exemplary damages, the plaintiff must prove
actual malice. 37 This provision does not entitle magazines to its
benefits. 38
California has adopted the Uniform Single Publication Act, as has
New York.39 The Single Publication Act precludes a plaintiff from
bringing more than one cause of action for publication of an allegedly
defamatory statement in one issue of a book, newspaper or magazine or
anyone broadcast over radio or television, or one presentation of a mo-
tion picture.4o Under the Act, as interpreted by the California courts,
"publication of an integrated issue of a mass media writing occurs upon
the first general distribution of the material to the public."4l
In California, Texas and Massachusetts, liability will not be imposed
on the operators, owners, agents or employees of radio or television
broadcasting stations for the utterance of defamatory statements by
others.42 New York's provision differs from those of Texas and Califor-
nia in that protection is afforded only if the defamatory remarks are
made by "any legally qualified candidate for public office ...."43 Addi-
tionally, in New York only cable television owners, directors or their
employees or agents are afforded the same type of protections described
above as given in Massachusetts, Texas and California.44
California, Texas and Massachusetts statutorily define libel, while
the District of Columbia and New York do not,45
36. CAL. CIV. CODE § 48a1 (1982).
37. Id. at 48a2.
38. Montandon v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 45 Cal. App. 3d 938, 952, 120 Cal. Rptr. 186,
195 (1975).
39. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3425.1-3425.5 (West 1970); Khaury v. Playboy Publications, 430 F.
Supp. 1342 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
40. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3425.3 (West 1970).
41. Strick v. Superior Court, County of Los Angeles, 143 Cal. App. 3d 916, 922,192 Cal. Rptr.
314 (1983).
42. CAL. CIV. CODE § 48.5 (West 1982); TEX CIV. CODE ANN. § 73.004 (Vernon 1986); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231 § 91A (West 1985).
43. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 75 (McKinney 1976).
44. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 830 (Mckinney 1982).
45. CAL. Civ. CODE § 45 (West 1982); TEX. CIV. CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Vernon 1986); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231 § 691 (West 1985).
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Broadcast defamation confuses and sometime:s defies the above-
stated generalization that printed defamation is libel, while spoken defa-
mation is slander. The historical basis of this dichotomy was not the
form of the publication, but its reach and degree of permanence (i.e., the
amount of reputational damage likely to be done by the publication).
Therefore, despite the fact that it is spoken, broadcast defamation is
treated as libel in the great majority of jurisdictions in the United
States.46 In California, however, defamation by radio or television is stat-
utorily defined as slander.47 Libel per se (libel on its face), with the pre-
sumption of damage, is recognized in all of the juris.dictions surveyed.48
California is the only jurisdiction researched which also has statutory
provisions defining slander (criminal and civil) and sllander per se.49 The
remaining jurisdictions have common law definitions for slander and/or
slander per se. so
Thus, the decisional law of all jurisdictions surveyed, and the statu-
tory law of the District of Columbia, make special provisions for the
news media in connection with actions alleging defamation. These spe-
cial provisions have the direct effect of protecting the news media, but
the purpose of these provisions is to protect the public, for it is a vital
assumption of the United States Constitution and the resultant form of
government that: "debate on national issues should be uninhibited, ro-
bust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public offi-
cials."sl Only the media are in a position to serve as generalized fora for
this debate.
II. INVASION OF PRIVACY
A law review article by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis,
entitled "The Right To Privacy,,,S2 is generally credited as the first con-
46. See, e.g., Matherson V. Marchello, 100 A.D.2d 233, 473 N.Y.S.2d 998 (1984) (holding
defamation by radio and television to be libel); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 568A (1977).
47. Arno v. Stewart, 245 Cal. App. 2d 955, 961, 54 Cal. Rptr. 392, 396 (1966).
48. Wortham v. Dunn & Bradstreet, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 633 (1975), aff'd, 537 F.2d 1142 (5th
Cir. 1976); Buckley v.Littell, 394 F. Supp. 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 539 F.2d
883 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977); Brewster v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp.,
188 F. Supp. 565 (D. Mass. 1960); Washington Annapolis Hotel Co. v. Riddle, 83 U.S. App. D.C.
288, 177 F.2d 732, 736 (1948); Childers v. San Jose Mercury Printing and Publishing Co., 105 Cal.
284, 38 P. 903 (1894) (malice is presumed where the publication is libelous per se).
49. CAL. CIV. CODE § 46 (West 1982); CAL. PENAL CODE § 258 (West 1970) (amended 1983).
50. See, Goree v. Cafnes, 625 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. App. 1981)(slanderous per se defined); Inger v.
Ross, 479 A.2d 1256 (D.C. App. 1984) (slanderous per se defined).
51. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
52. 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
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vincing assertion that a cause of action in tort should be recognized for
invasion of privacy. This landmark writing generally described the right
asserted as the "right to be let alone."53 From this basic concept have
evolved four distinct kinds of common law invasion of privacy torts cate-
gorized by Dean William Prosser as follows: "(1) intrusion upon one's
physical solitude or seclusion; (2) public disclosure of private facts;
(3) publicity that places someone in a false light in the public eye; and
(4) appropriation of one's name or likeness for another's benefit.,,54
Texas, California, the District of Columbia and Massachusetts rec-
ognize these four kinds of invasion of privacy.55 New York does not
recognize any common law right to privacy. The only privacy action
that may be brought in New York falls under New York Civil Rights
Law sections 50-51 (1976) (amended 1979), which specifies a cause of
action for appropriation of plaintiff's name or likeness for the commer-
cial benefit of another. Even this action is strictly construed by the
courts. 56 Among the jurisdictions surveyed, only California has statutes
governing all four kinds of invasions of privacy.
. A. Appropriation ofPlaintiff's Name or Likeness
California's statutory provisions allow, inter alia, a cause of action
for the appropriation of one's name, photograph or likeness for commer-
cial purposes.57 Section 3344 of the California Civil Code applies to indi-
viduals living at the time the violation occurs. It provides for the
assessment of actual and punitive damages against a person who know-
ingly appropriates another's name, voice, signature, photograph or like-
ness for commercial purposes without such person's consent.58 The news
media are exempt from the application of section 3344 when the use of
the personality's name, photograph or likeness is made in connection
with any news, public affairs or sports broadcast or account. 59
California courts have interpreted section 3344 to require the "de-
53. Id. at 193.
54. Handbook of the Law of Torts § 117 (5th ed. 1984).
55. Vassilades v. Garfinkel's. Brooks Bros., 492 A.2d 580 (D.C. 1985); Eastwood v. Superior
Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 417, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (1983); Gill v. Snow, 644 S.W.2d 222
(Tex. App. 1982).
56. Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 220 (1984) (use of modeling photo-
graph in shopping tips column not actionable); McGraw v. Watkins, 49 A.D.2d 958, 373 N.Y.S.2d
663 (1975) (in derogation of common law, right of privacy must be strictly construed); Namath v.
Sports Illustrated, 80 Misc. 2d 531, 363 N.Y.S.2d 276, aff'd. 48 A.D.2d 487,371 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1975)
(freedom of speech and press transcend right of privacy).
57. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 990, 3344 (West Supp. 1987).
58. Id. § 3344(a).
59. Id. § 3344(a), (f).
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fendant's use of the plaintiff's identity, the appropriation of plaintiff's
name or likeness to defendant's advantage commercially or otherwise,
lack of plaintiff's consent and a resulting injury," for liability to be im-
posed.60 California law requires, additionally, that the defendant know-
ingly use the plaintiff's name, photograph, or likeness for the purposes of
advertising or solicitation of purchases, and there must be a direct con-
nection between the use and the commercial purpose.61
New York Civil Rights Law section 50 is limited to use by the de-
fendant for trade or advertising purposes and does not apply to the "pub-
lication of newsworthy matters or events.,,62 An individual's voice,
hairdo, and characteristic clothing or accessories are not covered by sec-
tion 50, unlike California law, and thus may be legally appropriated in
New York, without the consent of the affected individua1.63
In Tropeano v. Atlantic Monthly CO.,64 the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts referred to Time, Inc. v. Hill,65 as an example of New
York's "expansive" interpretation of its privacy statute. The Massachu-
setts court went on to say that it would not interpret its state's privacy
law66 so broadly - despite the similarity of the language.67 In practice,
however, the application of the statutes is essentially the same. As in the
other jurisdictions surveyed, incidental, noncommercial use of a plain-
tiff's picture is not an actionable appropriation if the picture was used in
an informational manner and not for commercial purposes.68 Nor is
there an actionable appropriation when the publication concerns a mat-
ter of public interest.69 Like California law, New York's section 51 pro-
vides for recovery of compensatory and punitive damages.7o But, unlike
California law, section 51 also provides for injunctive relief.7I
Texas and the District of Columbia are similar in that both follow
the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977), section 652C regarding inva-
60. Eastwood, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 411, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 341.
61. [d. at 411-18, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 341; Johnson v. Harcourt, Brace. Javonovich, Inc., 43 Cal.
App. 3d 880, 894, 118 Cal. Rptr. 310, 381 (1914).
62. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 1916).
63. Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 122 Misc. 2d 603, 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct.
1984).
64. 319 Mass. 145, 141, 400 N.E.2d 841, 849 (1980).
65. 385 U.S. 314 (1961).
66. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, § 3A (West Supp. 1986).
61. Tropeano, 319 Mass. at 141, 400 N.E.2d at 849.
68. [d.
69. Old Colony Donuts, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 368 F. Supp. 185, 188 (D. Mass.
1914).
10. N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney Supp. 1981).
11. [d.
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sion of privacy.72 Both recognize an action for appropriation of an-
other's name or likeness for commercial purposes.73 In Texas, to prove a
cause of action for misappropriation, a plaintiff "must show that his or
her personal identity has been appropriated by the defendant for some
advantage, usually of commercial nature, to the defendant."74
B. Public Disclosure of Private Facts
The availability of a cause of action for public disclosure of private
facts is particularly problematic for journalists. Such an action differs
from one for defamation in that truth is no defense to this invasion of
privacy action. Indeed, it is often the very truth of the assertion that
makes its revelation especially objectionable. The law does not afford
this cause of action, however, to every individual who is the subject of
unwanted exposure. Rather, determination must be made based on the
information revealed, and the manner and extent of its revelation. In
order to recover for "public disclosure of private facts," the disclosure
must be communicated to the public generally or to a large number of
persons.75 Furthermore, the facts disclosed must be private facts not al-
ready known by the public;76 and the facts must be highly offensive to a
reasonable person and must not be of legitimate concern to the public.77
C. False Light
A claim for invasion of privacy based on publicity that places the
plaintiff in a false light in the public eye is treated similarly, in most
jurisdictions, to a public disclosure action, in that the publication must be
highly offensive to a reasonable person.78 The distinction, however, is
that the false light cause of action must be based on a falsehood or "half-
72. Vassilades. 492 A.2d at 587; Gill v. Snow, 644 S.W.2d 222, 224 (Tex. App. 1982).
73. Id. at 592; Kimbrough v. Coca-Cola/U.S.A., 521 S.W.2d 719, 722 (Tex. App. 1975).
74. National Bank of Commerce v. Shaklee Corp.• 503 F. Supp. 533, 540 (W.O. Tex. 1980).
75. Vassilades, 492 A.2d at 588; Porten v. Univ. of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 828,
134 Cal. Rptr. 839, 841 (1976); Bernstein v. National Broadcasting Co., 129 F. Supp. 817 (D.D.C.
1955), aff'd. 232 F.2d 369, cert. denied. 352 U.S. 945, (1956).
76. Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing, Co., 154 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 1045,201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 667-
68 (1984); Bernstein, 129 F. Supp. at 834.
77. Sipple, 154 Cal. App. 3d at 1046,201 Cal. Rptr. at 668-69. See also Sidis v. F-R Publishing
Co., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940); Bernstein, 129 F. Supp. at 831; National Bonding Agency v.
Demeson, 648 S.W.2d 748 (1983); Gill v. Snow, 644 S.W.2d 222, 224 (Tex. App. 1982) (which
follows the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6520 (1977).
78. Dresbach v. Doubleday & Co., 518 F. Supp. 1285, 1290 (D.D.C. 1981); Fellows v. National
Enquirer, Inc., 42 Cal. 3d 234, 238, 721 P.2d 97, 99, 228 Cal. Rptr. 215, 218 (1986); Vassiliades.492
A.2d at 587; Spahn v. Messner Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 219, 250 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1964), aff'd 23 A.D.2d 216,
260 N.Y.S.2d 451 (1965), aff'd 18 N.Y.S.2d 324, 221 N.E.2d 543, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1966).
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truth" that misrepresents the plaintiff's character or behavior.79
In Texas, California and the District of Columbia, a false light claim
brought by a private individual or a public figure against a media defend-
ant is analogous to a defamation action.80 Thus, the plaintiff in a false
light action is a private individual, a negligence standard is applied and
the plaintiff must prove only that the defendant acted with negligence in
publishing the statement. However, if the plaintiff is a public figure or
official, he or she must satisfy the requirement of actual malice as enunci-
ated in New York Times v. Sullivan. 81
California Civil Code section 48a, which requin:s a demand for re-
traction if a plaintiff brings a libel or slander action against a media de-
fendant, is applicable to a false light invasion of privacy claim. 82 Not
only does section 48a apply to false light claims, but the defense of truth,
the one year statute of limitations applicable to a libel action, and the
Uniform Single Publication Act apply as well. 83
D. Intrusion
Recognition of a cause of action for violation of plaintiff's privacy
by intrusion presupposes a physical sphere of legal protection. To this
extent, intrustion is conceptually analogous to trespass. The allegation
which clearly meets the requirements of a cause of action for intrusion is
electronic trespass - i.e., unauthorized wiretapping and eavesdrop-
ping.84 Generally, recovery for intrusion into an individual's solitude or
seclusion or his private affairs requires that the intrusion be intentional
and highly offensive to a reasonable person. 85
The media are not immune from suit for violations of this sort.
79. Dresbach. 518 F. Supp. at 1291; Meerpo1 v. Nizer, 381 F. Supp. 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Na-
tional Enquirer, Inc.. 211 Cal. Rptr. at 824, rev'd on other grounds, 42 Cal. 3d 234, 721 P.2d 97, 228
Cal. Rptr. 215 (1986); Snow, 644 S.W.2d at 224 (followed RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652 E (1977»; But see. Arrington v. New York Times, Co., 55 N.Y.2d 433, 434 N.E.2d 319,
N.Y.S.2d 541 (1982) (the court, in dicta, expressed its concern that a falSI: light action may restrain
the first amendment guarantee of freedom of the press).
80. Dresbach, 518 F. Supp. at 1288; Justice v. Belo Broadcasting Corp., 472 F. Supp. 145, 147
(N.D. Tex. 1979); Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 543,483 P.2d 34, 44, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 866, 876 (1971).
81. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See also, Eastwood. 149 Cal. App. 3d at 424, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 351.
82. Johnson v. Harcourt, Brace & Jovanovich, Inc., 43 Cal. App. 3d 880, 893-94, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 370, 380 (1974).
83. National Enquirer, 42 Cal. 3d at 245-46, 721 P.2d at 104-05, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
84. See. e.g.• Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971); Nader v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 570, 255 N.E.2d 765, 770, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647, 655 (1970) (applying District of
Columbia law).
85. Gill v. Snow, 644 S.W.2d 222, 224 (Tex. App. 1982) (adopting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 652 B (1977».
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"Privilege concepts developed in defamation cases and to some extent in
privacy actions ... are not relevant in determining liability for intrusive
conduct .... No interest protected by the First Amendment is adversely
affected by permitting damages for intrusion . . . ."86
E. Right 0/ Publicity
It appears most courts have deemed the right to privacy a personal
right that does not survive the death of the putative victim. No relational
privacy right exists. 87 Some jurisdictions, however, recognize a right of
publicity, which is different from and exists independently of a right of
privacy. The right of publicity is frequently raised as an issue in privacy
cases involving the appropriation of an individual's name or likeness for
commercial purposes. 88 The right of publicity is defined as the "right to
grant the exclusive privilege of publishing [one's] picture."89 The right is
considered a property right, which is transferable and survives the death
of the individual whose right was violated.90
A cause of action for the right of publicity generally requires that
the individual's name or likeness has a publicity value and that the de-
fendant appropriates it for commercial purposes.91 For the right to be
descendible in California, the individual must have exploited the right
during his or her lifetime.92 New York, however, does not require such
previous exploitation.93
Although the right to privacy and the right of publicity are separate
causes of action in New York, the right of publicity is said to be sub-
sumed in the statutory right of privacy under New York Civil Rights
Law sections 50 and 51, irrespective of whether the two actions exist
separately.94 To establish a claim under sections 50 and 51 for a viola-
tion of the right of publicity, three elements must be demonstrated:
86. Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 249-50. (See infra "PUBLICATION OF RECORDED
CONVERSATIONS").
87. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 821, 603 P.2d 425, 430, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323,
328 (1979); Moore v. Charles B. Pierce Film Enter., Inc., 589 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. App. 1979).
88. Southeast Bank, N.A. v. Lawrence, 104 A.D.2d 213, 483 N.Y.S.2d 218 (A.D. 1st Dept.
1984), rev'd on other grounds. 66 N.Y.2d 910, 489 N.E.2d 744, 498 N.Y.S.2d 775 (1985).
89. Id. at 217, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 221 (quoting Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum,
Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953) (per curiam».
90. /d. at 219, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 223.
91. Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 689 F.2d 317, 322 (2d Cir. 1982);
Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publication, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 228, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd. 745 F.2d
123 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied. 471 U.S. 1054 (1985).
92. Groucho Marx Productions. Inc.• 689 F.2d at 322.
93. Southeast Bank. N.A.. 104 A.D.2d at 218-19, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 222, rev'd on other grounds,
66 N.Y.2d 910, 489 N.E.2d 744, 498 N.Y.S.2d 775 (1985).
94. Brinkley v. Casa Blancas, 80 A.D.2d 428, 439, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1012 (1981).
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"(1) the use of a person's name or photograph; (2) for a commercial pur-
pose; and (3) the failure to procure the person's written consent for such
use.,,95 These requirements are the same as those for an appropriation
action under section 50. Thus, New York protects the right to publicity
under the right of privacy.
California is the only jurisdiction among those surveyed which stat-
utorily provides a cause of action for the unauthorized appropriation of a
deceased personality's name, voice, signature, photograph or likeness.96
Section 990 of the California Civil Code allows th~~ right to be trans-
ferred. 97 However, it must be either an inter vivos transfer or a transfer by
contract, trust or testamentary document; if it is not, rights under section
990 terminate.98 Under this California law, consent to publish may be
given by the transferee of the right. 99 The cause of action under section
990 must be brought within fifty years of the death of the person whose
publicity right is at issue. 100
Under section 990, consent is not required for the use of a "name,
voice, signature, photograph or likeness in connection with any news,
public affairs or sports broadcast or account."101 Also, liability will not
be imposed on the employers or owners of the medium used for advertis-
ing, including newpaper, radio and television networks, "when any ad-
vertisement solicitation in violation of [section 990] is published or
disseminated," unless the owner or employee allows such use with actual
knowledge of the unauthorized use. 102 Section 990 does not apply to the
use of a deceased personality's name, voice, signature, photograph or
likeness in "material that is of newsworthy value." 103 No case law exists
interpreting section 990, which was enacted in 1984. However, prior to
its enactment such a cause of action was not permitted because the right
was considered personal, and thus, died with the deceased. 104 Cases sub-
sequent to the enactment of section 990 would probably be decided
differently, provided the person bringing the action satisfied the require-
ments of section 990.
As the foregoing discussion of invasion of privacy indicates, the ju-
95. Id. at 440. 438 N.Y.S.2d at 1012.
96. CAL CIv. CODE § 990 (West 1984).
97. Id. § 990(b).
98. Id. § 990(e).
99. Id. § 990(c).
100. Id. § 990(g).
101. Id. § 9900).
102. Id. § 990(1).
103. Id. § 990(h)(2).
104. Lugosi. 25 Cal. 3d at 819. 603 P.2d at 425. 160 Cal. Rptr. at 326.
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risdictions surveyed are similar in their treatment of invasion of privacy
actions. California provides extensive statutory provisions governing in-
vasion of privacy actions and even provides constitutional protection for
the right. The remaining jurisdictions do not afford such broad protec-
tion. This contrast indicates that Calfornia desires to offer its citizens
more protection against invasion of privacy than other jurisdictions or, at
least, that the California legislature has chosen to assume this function
rather than leaving it to the state's courts.
In the law of invasion of privacy, special protection is again afforded
the news media, but only against allegations of commercial exploitation
(i. e., appropriation of name or likeness, violation of the right to publicity,
or false light portrayal). Here, the policy objective is that the media not
be inhibited by fear of endless actions based on the use of names, photo-
graphs, and the like in connection with legitimate accounts of news-
worthy events. None of the jurisdictions surveyed, however, gives the
media any special protection against actions for intrusion, or public dis-
closure of private facts.
III. CAMERAS IN THE COURTROOM
Representatives of the printed news media have traditionally been
allowed access to judicial proceedings. However, since the advent of elec-
tronic news coverage, the issue of permitting microphones and cameras
to record or broadcast judicial proceedings has been hotly contested.
The key issue when film or video coverage of courtroom proceedings is
questioned is how to balance the competing interests involved. These in-
terests are the right of the public - as represented by the press - to
know, and the right of the defendant to a fair trial, unfettered by poten-
tially prejudicial publicity or by any compromise of judicial integrity. lOS
Of the jurisdictions surveyed, only California and Texas have per-
manently adopted rules permitting electronic media coverage of judicial
proceedings under certain circumstances. 106 New York and the District
of Columbia prohibit such coverage when the proceedings involve the
actual or potential testimony of witnesses. 107 Massachusetts permits
105. San Jose Mercury News v. The Municipal Court Sunnyvale Cupertino Judicial District of
Santa Clara County, 30 CaI.3d 498,502-03,638 P.2d 655, 179 Cal. Rptr. 762, 774 (1982); See also,
Commonwealth v. Border, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 666,448 N.E.2d 387 (1983); appeal denied, 389 Mass.
1102,451 N.E.2d 1186 (Mass App. 1983); Application of Hearld Co. v. Marianai, No. 85-195, slip
op. (N.Y. 4th Dept. April 5, 1985); Estes v. State of Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
106. CAL. R. CT. § 980(b) (West Supp. 1986); TEXAS CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon
3A(7) (1974).
107. N.Y. CIY. RIGHTS LAW § 52 (1976); D.C. CT. RULE 53(b)(I).
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electronic coverage of judicial proceedings on an experimental basis. 108
Canon 3A(7) of the American Bar Association Code of Judicial
Conduct is the basis for the Texas rule governing cameras in the court-
room. Texas has adopted Canon 3A(7) in its entirety. Canon 3A(7) es-
tablishes a presumptive prohibition against electronic media coverage,
but such coverage may be permitted at the discretion of the trial judge. 109
Coverage will be denied if the presiding judge believes the electronic re-
cordings will "distract the participants or impair the dignity of the pro-
ceedings." 110 Thus, in Texas, the defendant's right to an impartial trial is
the paramount consideration in deciding whether electronic media cover-
age of judicial proceedings will be permitted.
California courts have taken a similar position. Under Rule 980(b)
of the California Rules of Court, the decision whether to allow coverage
is completely within the discretion of the trial court judge. III The trial
judge has the power, in the interest of justice and to protect the rights of
the parties, to exclude cameras from the courtroom. 112 Rule 980 pro-
vides that coverage will be allowed only upon written order of the court;
film or electronic coverage which is not specifically included in the order
is not permitted. 113 New York's prohibition of sue;h coverage is also
grounded in these interests and in the conclusion, though somewhat
more emphatically stated, that the "the risks to the administration of
justice outweigh the right of the public to know.,,114
Estes v. State of Texas 115 was a landmark case on the issue of cam-
eras in the courtroom. In Estes, the Supreme Court of the United States
reversed Texas trial and appellate courts, upholding defendant's claim
that he was denied due process, in violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment, by the television and radio broadcast of his trial. The Supreme
Court made it clear, however, that its decision in Estes was based at least
partly on the fact that the defendant had objected, at the time of the trial,
to the broadcast of the proceedings. This position is not unlike that
taken by Texas courts addressing the issue on two other occasions. I 16
In Farrar v. State, a Texas appeals court refused to reverse the con-
108. S.J.C. Rule 3.09, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(7).
109. Id.
110. TEX. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(7)(a) (West 1986).
III. CAL. R. CT. § 980(b) (West Supp. 1986).
112. Id.
113. Id. § 980(d).
114. Ad Hoc Committee on Cameras in Ihe Courtroom 3, September 6, 1984.
115. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
116. Bradley v. Texas, 470 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1972), and Farrar v. Stale, 162 Tex. Crim. 136,
277 S.W.2d 114, cert. denied. sub nom. Farrar V. Texas, 350 U.S. 854 (1955).
738 SOUTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16
viction of the defendant, where the trial judge had permitted a newspaper
photographer to photograph courtroom proceedings. ll7 The court em-
phasized that its decision should not be construed as approving the prac-
tice of taking pictures in the courtroom. The conviction was upheld
because the defendant had not objected to the photography and no harm
was shown. 118
In Bradley v. Texas, 119 the trial judge permitted motion picture and
still photography of the proceedings against appellant in her trial for aid-
ing and abetting an offense committed by her husband. The appellant
claimed, on this basis, that she was denied due process. Citing Estes, the
appeals court stated that the coverage was "inherently prejudicial even
absent a showing of actual harm to the defendant."12o However, the
court rejected the defendant's due process claim, stating that it was "un-
able to say that the conclusions of either [lower] court [were] clearly er-
roneous" and that a remand was unlikely to adduce evidence to the
contrary. 121
Thus, although the Supreme Court in Estes reversed Texas trial and
appellate courts, it does not appear that Texas is at odds with the holding
of Estes or Canon 3A(7). Rather, Texas will generally allow coverage
where no harm to the defendant is shown and the defendant consents, or
at least fails to object. This position, while potentially somewhat more
permissive than that taken in California, appears to be in keeping with
the dictate of Canon 3A(7).
In Massachusetts, the most recent case on cameras in the courtroom
was Commonwealth v. Burden. 122 In Burden, the court upheld the deci-
sion of the superior court permitting television cameras in the court-
room. The trial court had weighed the interests of the defendant in
receiving a fair trial against the public's right to know, and concluded
that "the appropriate safeguard against such prejudice is the defendant's
right to demonstrate that the media's coverage of his case ... compro-
mised the ability of the particular jury that heard the case to adjudicate
fairly."123 Thus, the Massachusetts rule tends to favor electronic media
coverage of judicial proceedings by requiring the defendant to prove prej-
udice before prohibiting such coverage.
The public and judicial mood appears to be shifting toward toler-
117. Farrar. 277 S.W.2d at 119.
118. [d. at 117.
119. Bradley. 470 F.2d at 787.
120. [d.
121. [d. at 788.
122. 15 Mass. App. Ct. 666, 448 N.E.2d 387 (1983).
123. [d. at 675, 448 N.E.2d at 395.
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ance of cameras in the courtroom. However, such tolerance does not
comprise an absolutely protected constitutional right. In California,
Texas and Massachusetts coverage will be permitted, at the discretion of
the trial judge, if the defendant's right to a fair trial can be accommo-
dated. New York and the District of Columbia, however, do not appear
to be following the trend and the courts apparently are not considered
the appropriate forum for such change. Thus, the media will have to
press their claim of a right to audio-visual coverage of courtroom pro-
ceedings on a case-by-case basis.
The issue of cameras in the courtroom has probably come to be re-
garded as an exclusively news media-related issue. In other words, there
has been no broad-based assertion of any right of private individuals to
photograph or otherwise record courtroom proceedi.ngs. This is proba-
bly because - notwithstanding repeated holdings that the media's right
to access is no greater than the public'sI24- the practical reality is that:
if a television reporter is to convey ... sights and sounds to those who
cannot personally visit [a] place, he must use cameras and sound
equipment. In short, terms of access that are reasonably imposed on
individual members of the public may, if they impede effective report-
ing without sufficient justification, be unreasonable as applied to jour-
nalists who are there to convey to the general public what the visitors
see. 125
IV. MEDIA SHIELD LAW (REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE)
Among the issues considered in this survey, the matter of so-called
"shield laws" is the only one exclusively tailored to specific concerns of
the news media. Sometimes, before news media representatives can ob-
tain information from certain types of news sources, they must give as-
surances that the identities of these sources will not be revealed. Can a
member of the news media be compelled to dIvulge the identity of a con-
fidential news source, or does he or she have a legal privilege not to dis-
close such sources? The answer to this question ma.y depend upon the
information sought and the role of the party seeking disclosure.
Only California and New York have statutory provisions which
grant members of the news media a privilege not to disclose confidential
news sources - and this privilege is qualified. 126 California has gone
further than New York, and is the only state that has given the media a
124. See. e.g.. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1978).
125. Houchins. 438 U.S. at 17 (Stewart, J. concurring).
126. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1987); N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney
Supp. 1987).
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constitutional right to refuse to disclose their confidential sources of in-
formation. 127 Texas and the District of Columbia recognize the privi-
lege, but only under limited circumstances. 128 Massachusetts, on the
other hand, generally adheres to the view that there exists no constitu-
tional newsman's privilege, qualified or absolute, to refuse to appear and
testify before a court or grand jury. 129 Those jurisdictions that recognize
the privilege, either by statute or case law, assert policy bases tied di-
rectly to the first amendment. 130
As with many of the other topics discussed in this article, there are
competing interests to be balanced when the issue of disclosure is raised.
Therefore, the privilege is qualified. As one structural means of compro-
mising or balancing these interests, the jurisdictions surveyed generally
provide protection for members of the news media only against citation
for contempt for failure to disclose sources of information. The privilege
does not insulate media representatives from other sanctions assessed by
the courtS. 131 There is no protection where the threat to the fairness of
the trial process outweighs the right of the press to gather news. 132 Addi-
tionally, where the reporter has information relevant to the defense or
the information or source concealed is an essential element of a plaintiff's
cause of action, disclosure is compelled. 133 Moreover, if the information
or source sought has already been made public, the privilege does not
exist. 134 If the news reporter is a party in a libel suit, the courts will
generally compel disclosure because the source of information is usually
evidentiary proof essential to a plaintiff's cause of action. 135
Several tests have been outlined to determine whether compulsion is
127. CAL. CONST.• Art I, § 2(b) (1879, amended 1980).
128. Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394 (1973); Dallas Oil & Gas, Inc. v.
Mouer, 533 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. App. 1976).
129. In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971), aff'd. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
130. Anderson v. Nixon, 444 F. Supp. 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1978); C.B.S., Inc. v. Superior Court, 85
Cal. App. 3d 241, 149 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1978); People v. Marahan, 81 Misc. 2d 637, 368 N.Y.S.2d 685
(1975); Dallas Oil & Gas v. Mouer, 533 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. App. 1976).
131. See Rosata v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190,224, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427, 450 (1975),
cert. denied. 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
132. CBS. Inc.• 85 Cal. App. 3d at 251, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 427; People v. Monroe, 82 Misc. 2d
850, 370 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (1975); Adams v. Associated Press, 46 F.R.D. 439 (S.D. Tex. 1969), cert.
denied. 402 U.S. 901 (1971).
133. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (applying New York law); Nixon. 444 F. Supp. at
1199; Rosato. 51 Cal. App. 3d at 218, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 446; Commonwealth v. Corsetti. 387 Mass.
1, 438 N.E.2d 805 (1982).
134. CBS. Inc.• 85 Cal. App. 3d at 250, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 426; Corsetti. 387 Mass. at 6, 438
N.E.2d at 809; People v. Iannaccone, 112 Misc. 2d 1057, 447 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1982).
135. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979); Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
Dalitz v. Penthouse Int'I Ltd., 168 Cal. App. 3d 468, 478, 214 Cal. Rptr. 254, 260 (1985); Adams v.
Associated Press, 46 F.R.D. 439 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
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appropriate. In Texas, the test is whether the infomLation (1) is relevant;
(2) cannot be obtained by alternative means; and (3) is the subject of a
compelling interest. 136 In California, the courts must make a factual de-
termination of "(1) the nature of the proceedings, (2) the status of the
newspaper as a party or nonparty, (3) alternative sources of information
and (4) the relationship of the information to the heart of the claim."m
As amended in 1981, New York's shield law provides the broadest
protection. 138 Protection is afforded a newsperson's source even if the
material or source sought is highly relevant to a particular governmental
inquiry.139 In People v. Iannaccone, 140 the court interpreted the amend-
ment to protect both confidential and nonconfidential information im-
parted to a journalist. 141
On the other end of the spectrum, Massachusetts provides the least
protection, favoring instead the view that the "public has a right to every
man's evidence."142 Thus, any testimonial privilege is to be strictly lim-
ited. 143 In keeping with this construction, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts has found that the state's laws express no legislative pol-
icy favoring expansion of the testimonial privileges. 144 Furthermore, that
court has stated that the Commonwealth affords no "constitutional
newsman's privilege, either qualified or absolute, to refuse to appear and
testify before a court or grand jury."145
Recently, the Massachusetts Supreme Court was petitioned by the
Governor's Press Shield Law Task Force to adopt rules providing for a
qualified reporter's privilege. 146 The court denied the petition after ana-
lyzing the proposed guidelines, citing detailed reasons for its decision. 147
The court concluded that the common law approach (i. e., a case-by-case
balancing of the public interest in every person's evidence against the
public interest in protecting the free flow of information) was ade-
136. E.g.. Miller v. Transamerica Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 726 (5th Cir. 1980), cerro denied. 540
U.S. 1041 (1981).
137. Da!itz, 168 Cal. App. 3d at 477-78, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 260 (quoting KSDQ V. Superior
Court, 136 Cal. App. 3d 375, 385, 186 Cal. Rptr. 211,217 (1982».
138. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1987).
139. Id.
140. 112 Misc. 2d 1057,447 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1982).
141. Id. at 1062, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 999.
142. In re Pappas, 358 Mass. at 697, 266 N.E.2d at 299.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 610 n.8, 266 N.E.2d at 301 n.8.
145. Id. at 612, 266 N.E.2d at 303.
146. Petition for Promulgation of Rules Regarding the Protection of Confidental News Sources
and Other Unpublished Information. 395 Mass. 164, 479 N.E.2d 154 (1985).
147. Id. at 167, 479 N.E.2d at 156-59.
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quate. 148 It appears unlikely, therefore, that Massachusetts will enact a
shield law, as long as the legislature and the courts believe the common
law approach adequately protects freedom of the press.
Even when a reporter has a qualified privilege not to divulge confi-
dential news sources or information, the key term is "qualified." The
privilege protects a reporter only from citation for contempt; it does not
prevent compulsion where the countervailing interests are deemed to
outweigh the reporter's right to maintain the confidentiality of his or her
sources. Furthermore, there appears to be no trend, in any of the juris-
dictions surveyed, toward an extension of the privilege. Hence, New
York seems to have taken the most liberal approach in favor of
nondisclosure.
The common purpose of these shield laws - limited as they are -
is not to keep reporters out of jail, but to keep them from becoming un-
witting arms of the police.
V. PUBLICATION OF RECORDED CONVERSATIONS
All the jurisdictions surveyed have statutory provisions which pro-
vide criminal penalties for unauthorized wiretapping or eavesdrop-
ping. 149 Texas, New York, Massachusetts and California consider an
unauthorized eavesdrop or wiretap an invasion of privacy. California's
statute specifically states that the legislature intended to proscribe unau-
thorized interception of communications because of the increasing
"threat to the free exercise of personal liberties" and the use of wiretap-
ping and eavesdropping devices to invade the privacy of the citizens of
California. 150 In California and New York, criminal penalties may lie for
the interception of oral communications by eavesdropping or wiretap-
ping devices based on a theory of invasion of privacy.ISI
Except in California, the penalties under these statutes apply only to
unauthorized interceptions. No violation has occurred if one of the par-
ties to the conversation consents to the recording. ls2 In Chaplin v. Na-
148. [d. at 168, 479 N.E.2d at 158-59
149. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 630-32 (Deering 1983 & Supp. 1987); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-542 to
-543 (\981); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, §§ 99-99A (West 1970); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§§ 250.05-.35 (McKinney 1980); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 16.02 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
150. CAL. PENAL CODE § 630 (West 1970). The Massachusetts statute includes similar lan-
guage. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (West 1970).
151. CAL. PENAL CODE § 632 (West Supp. 1987); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.25 (McKinney
1980); Connin v. Connin, 89 Misc. 2d 548, 392 N.Y.S.2d 530 (\976). In Texas, civil liability is
imposed, but not under the theory of invasion of privacy. TEX. CIY. CODE ANN. § 123.002 (Vernon
1986).
152. People v. Lasher, 58 N.Y.2d 962, 447 N.E.2d 70, 460 N.Y.S.2d 523 (1983); D.C. CODE
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tional Broadcasting Co., 153 a nationally prominent movie actor and film
producer brought invasion of privacy actions against a newspaper colum-
nist and radio commentator, Gardner, and a broadcasting company,
NBC. The plaintiff alleged injury based on a series of syndicated articles
written by Gardner, and on two of his weekly radio programs broadcast
by NBC. 154 One broadcast involved the publication by the radio station
of a telephone conversation between Gardner and the plaintiff's butler.
The conversation had been tape recorded without the butler's knowl-
edge. ISS The other broadcast involved a recording of a telephone conver-
sation Gardner had with the plaintiff. 156 Both recordings were made
without plaintiff's consent.
The court concluded that the plaintiff's invasion of privacy claim
should fail because no common law right of privacy was recognized in
New York,157 and plaintiff did not meet the requirements of New York
Civil Rights Law sections 50 or 51 because the radio broadcasts did not
use the recording of plaintiff's voice for the "purposes of trade" within
the meaning of the statute. ISS The court stated that "the dissemination
of news or the reporting of matters of public interest has been held not to
be for trade purposes, while fiction or fictionalized information has been
held to fall within the New York statute."159 Thus, in New York an
action for invasion of privacy under sections 50 and 51 must be based on
fiction or fictionalized information and not news or the reporting of mat-
ters of public interest.
More fundamentally, the court distinguished Chaplin from cases in
which "third parties" had intercepted and/or recordt:d confidential com-
munications between others, saying "[i]t is unthinkable that the revela-
tion of the content of a telephone conversation by one of the parties to it
violates any legally protected right of privacy."160
Despite the apparently broad coverage of the above-referenced
prohibitions on wiretapping, the District of Columbia, Massachusetts,
New York and Texas adhere to the "one party rule," as delineated in
Chaplin. Thus, in these jurisdictions, the consent of the journalist who
ANN. § 23542(b) (2); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (West 1970); TEX. CIV. CODE ANN.
§ 123.001 (Vernon 1986).
153. 15 F.R.D. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (applying New York law).
154. [d. at 136.
155. [d.
156. [d.
157. [d. at 139.
158. [d.
159. [d. at 138.
160. [d. at 141.
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electronically records an interview without the knowledge or consent of
the interviewee is enough to defeat the interviewee's claim that the re-
cording was a criminal act.
The California statute is a conspicuous exception to the general rule.
The California Penal Code provides, in relevant part, that:
Every person who, intentionally and without the consent of all parties
to a confidential communication, by means of any electronic amplify-
ing or recording device, eavesdrops upon or records the confidential
communication ... shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thou-
sand five hundred dollars . . . or imprisonment in the county jail not
exceeding one year ... or by both that fine and imprisonment ... [for
the offender's first violation of this statute]. 161
The wording of the statute is similar to those in the other jurisdictions,
except the consent of all parties is required. In People v. Wyrick, 162 this
provision withstood a constitutional challenge for alleged vagueness.
The statute was interpreted as making it criminal for one party to record
a confidential telephone conversation without the consent of the other
party.163 This interpretation has been repeatedly confirmed. 164
The above-cited cases, and the statute itself, make clear that this
provision applies only to "confidential" communications. "Confidential
communication" is defined as "any communication carried on in circum-
stances as may reasonably indicate that any party to the communication
desires it to be confined to the parties thereto, but excludes a communica-
tion made in a public gathering ...."165 The California courts have
interpreted this provision to require that at least one party to the conver-
sation had a reasonable expectation of privacy at the time of the record-
ing. 166 Based as it is on an invasion of privacy rationale, this statutory
provision prohibits recordation in and of itself; no subsequent publication
is necessary to complete the offense. This is also true of invasion of pri-
vacy by intrusion in the other jurisdictions surveyed. 167 Not surpris-
ingly, the prohibition does not extend to the making of notes or a
subsequent stenographic summary of one's recollections. 168
The California journalist may find refuge in one of two fairly narrow
161. CAL. PENAL CODE § 632(a) (West Supp. 1987).
162. 77 Cal. App. 3d 903, 144 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1978).
163. Id.
164. People v. Suite, 101 Cal. App. 3d 680, 161 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1980); Warden v. Kahn, 99 Cal.
App. 3d 80S, 161 Cal. Rptr. 471 (1979).
165. CAL. PENAL CODE § 632(c) (West Supp. 1987).
166. People v. Newton, 42 Cal. App. 3d 292, 116 Cal. Rptr. 690 (1974), cert. denied. 420 U.S.
937 (1975).
167. See. e.g.• Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 704 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied. 395 U.S. 947 (1969).
168. Wyrick. 77 Cal. App. 3d at 907, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 41.
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statutory exceptions to the general prohibition against electronic record-
ing. It is not illegal to record a conversation - without the consent of
the other party to the conversation - if the recording is done pursuant
to the direction of a law enforcement official acting within the scope of
his or her authority. 169 Nor is it illegal to secretly record a confidential
communication - even on one's own initiative -- for the purpose of
obtaining evidence regarding extortion, kidnapping, bribery, any felony
involving violence against a person, or the making of phone calls in-
tended to annoy. 170
While these statutory exceptions will sometimes be crucial, the gen-
eral reality is that, in the interest of protecting its citizens' privacy, Cali-
fornia law deprives journalists of an important tool available to news
people in all the other jurisdictions surveyed. The California courts are
aware that in so doing, the state's legislature has gone further than is
required either by the United States or the California Constitution. 171
Two provisions of federal law are also particularly relevant in this
regard. The United States Code makes it unlawful to intercept and di-
vulge the contents of a telephone conversation. 172 Unlike the California
statute, however, this provision has been interpreted. as comporting with
the above-described "one-party rule." Therefore, if one party to a tele-
phone conversation does the recording, or if one party to the conversa-
tion consents to its recordation by a third party, there is no violation. 173
Additionally, any party to a recorded telephone conversation may pub-
lish it for his or her own benefit. 174
A second relevant federal regulation is imposed on broadcasters by
the Federal Communication Commission. FCC regulations provide that:
Before recording a telephone conversation for broadcast, or broadcast-
ing such a conversation simultaneously with its occurrence, a licensee
shall inform any party to the call of the licensee's intention to broad-
cast the conversation, except where such party is aware, or may be
presumed to be aware from the circumstances of the conversation, that
it is being or likely will be broadcast. 175
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that in all the jurisdictions sur-
veyed, the legality of the recordation is a matter entirely separate from
169. CAL. PENAL CODE § 633 (West Supp. 1987).
170. [d. at 633.5.
171. See People v. Cooks, 141 Cal. App. 3d 224, 190 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1983), cert. denied. 464 U.S.
1046 (1984).
172. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1982).
173. [d.
174. [d.
175. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1206 (1987).
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the invasion of privacy, if any, resulting from the subsequent publication
of the recorded information.
IV. PUBLICATION OF PILFERED DOCUMENTS
The celebrated "Pentagon Papers" casesl76 come readily to mind in
any discussion of journalists' publication of pilfered documents. Those
cases, however, had far less to do with the publication of pilfered docu-
ments than with the classic but narrow doctrine of prior restraint. 177
Of greater concern to the news media is the reality that the publica-
tion of pilfered documents may result in (1) charges of larceny, and
(2) civil and/or criminal invasion of privacy actions as well as (3) possi-
ble charges of receipt of stolen property by the publisher. If government
documents are pilfered, there may be increased penalties attached to cer-
tain of these charges and claims, if proven.
Each of the jurisdictions surveyed has at least one statutory provi-
sion regarding larceny. 178 These statutes vary in their precise definitions
and classifications of larceny and in their delineation of applicable penal
sanctions. Generally, however, each defines larceny as the trespassory
taking of the property of another with the intent to deprive the owner,
more or less permanently, of the possession, use and/or enjoyment of the
property so taken. Each jurisdiction defines "property" so as to include
documents, e.g., "any article, substance, or thing of value." 179
The "taking" aspect of the crime has been variously defined by stat-
ute and case law, but none of the jurisdictions surveyed requires a hostile
confrontation in order to satisfy this requirement. The Texas statute, for
example, provides that the taking of property without the owner's con-
sent - or the consent of a person legally authorized to act for the owner
- is larceny.180 It further states that consent is not valid if it is induced
by deception or coercion, given by a person the defendant knew was not
legally authorized to act for the owner, or given by a person who by
reason of youth, intoxication, mental disease or defect, was known by the
defendant to be unable to make a reasonable disposition of the
property. 181
The journalist or publisher who, as a third party, knowingly receives
176. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
177. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
178. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 487,492 (West 1970 & Supp. 1987); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3811
(1986); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 25 (West Supp. 1986); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.05
(McKinney Supp. 1987); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
179. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.00 (McKinney Supp. 1987).
180. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.01(4) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
181. [d.
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stolen documents may be guilty of a criminal offense in any of the juris-
dictions surveyed. In some jurisdictions larceny is defined broadly
enough to include such a third party.182 Other jurisdictions have sepa-
rate statutes providing penalties for the knowing receipt of stolen
property. 183
What if the journalist or publisher does not take and retain the doc-
ument, but merely photocopies and returns it? This course of action does
not fit within the technical definition of larceny, but the law does afford
sanctions. First, there are the various causes of action for invasion of
privacy (most likely among these are intrusion and public disclosure of
private facts). In addition, if the document contains information qualify-
ing as a "trade secret," there are a range of statutory provisions prohibit-
ing the taking of the information itself - not merely the document
physically embodying the information. 184 The following definition of
"trade secret" is typical: "the whole or any part of any scientific or tech-
nical information, design, process, procedure, formula, or improvement
that has value and that the owner has taken measures to prevent from
becoming available to persons other than those selected by the owner to
have access for limited purposes."185
Cases applying these laws to facts arising out of the practice of jour-
nalism are few. In People v. Kunkin,186 the court held that there was
enough evidence to show that published documents had been stolen, but
not enough evidence to infer that the publisher knew or should have
known the documents were stolen. 187 An invasion of privacy issue was
not raised in Kunkin, but presumably an action would lie in this situation
if the publication of the document would invade the privacy of a person
identified in the publication.
Kunkin illustrates that a publisher may be charged with and con-
victed of receipt of stolen goods, if he or she knew or should have known
the documents were stolen. This conclusion would probably be the same
in other jurisdictions depending upon how their penal statutes define the
receipt of stolen goods. Furthermore, except in New York, where the tort
of invasion of privacy is restricted, there may also be an action for inva-
sion of privacy.
In California, as in the District of Columbia, if the pilfered docu-
182. See. e.g.. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(a) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
183. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 496(1) (West 1970 & Supp. 1987).
184. See, e.g.. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 31.05(b) (Vernon 1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
266, § 30(4) (West 1970).
185. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.05(a)(4) (Vernon 1974).
186. 9 Cal. 3d 245, 507 P.2d 1392, 107 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1973).
187. [d. at 255-56, 507 P.2d at 1399-1400, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 191-92.
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ments are government documents, the penalties are different. The receipt
of criminal records or information from such records by an unauthorized
person is a misdemeanor under California Penal Code section 11143.188
However, the statute exempts publishers, editors, reporters and other
persons connected with or employed by a radio or television station,
newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication. 189 This exemption
was challenged in McCall v. Oroville Mercury Co., 190 where the plaintiff
argued that section 11143 was applicable to media members. The case
involved a newspaper's publication of certain excerpts from Justice De-
partment records. The plaintiff contended that the records were unlaw-
fully obtained based on section 11143. The court, however, held that
section 11143 exempted all members of the news media, and not just
those who were subject to contempt citations for failure to disclose
sources of information. 191
The publication of pilfered documents may bring into conflict the
public's right to know and the rights of the individual or - in the case of
government documents - the state's interest in the security of the state
or its citizens. If the documents taken are government documents, the
content of the published documents is material. If the documents pose a
threat to a state's security or to its citizens, the interests of the state may
override the public's "right to know.,,192 However, if there is no threat to
either the state's security or its citizens, then the right of the public to
know will be given deference. 193
VII. OPEN MEETINGS LEGISLATION
Each of the jurisdictions surveyed statutorily requires government
or quasi-government meetings to be open to the public. 194 California is
unique among the jurisdictions surveyed in that it has one statute for
legislative bodies of local agencies and another for state bodies and public
agencies.
Generally, it is the public policy of each of these jurisdictions sur-
188. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11143 (West 1982).
189. See MEDIA SHIELD LAW discussion, supra.
190. 142 Cal. App. 3d 80S, 191 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1983).
191. [d. at 808, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 283.
192. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.s. 713, 735-37 (1971) (White, J., concurring)
(publication of military or classified information property subject of criminal prosecution).
193. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974) (absent claim of military, diplomatic, or
sensitive national security secrets, President must produce documents for court's inspection).
194. CAL. GOy'T CODE §§ 54950·61 (West 1983); id. §§ 11120·31 (West 1980); D.C. CODE
ANN. § \.1504 (1981); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 39 § 23 A·C (West 1985); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW
§§ 100-104 (McKinney Supp. 1986); TEX. REY. CIY. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17 (Vernon 1970).
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veyed that state bodies, public agencies and the legislative bodies of local
agencies are to conduct their meetings openly so that the public can be
informed, and to prevent secrecy in public policy deliberations and
decisions. 195
The cited statutes specifically exempt certain meetings from their
application. 196 The cases in these jurisdictions are in agreement that the
exemptions are to be narrowly construed to afford maximum access and
to fulfill the purposes of the statutes. 197
Several types of meetings are closed to the public in all the jurisdic-
tions: meetings concerning state security; meetings concerning the ap-
pointment, dismissal or employment of a public employee or to hear
complaints or charges against such employee; discussions regarding
pending or current litigation involving the public agency; and meetings
regarding the administration of examinations for licenses. Since the ex-
emptions are to be narrowly construed, the mandates of the acts must be
strictly followed. Violation of the statutes may result in criminal sanc-
tions and invalidation of actions taken during a closed session in viola-
tion of the statute. 198
Media organizations have on several occasions instituted actions to
enforce the provisions of an Open Meetings Act. In these instances the
courts must decide whether the meeting is required to be open to the
public, or falls under one of the exemptions, and whether the press has
rights greater than those afforded the general public under the statute.
In Texas, the leading case on this topic is City ofAbilene v. Shackle-
ford. 199 In Abilene, the issue was whether the press had a right to chal-
195. Ghiglione v. School Comm. of Southridge, 376 Mass. 70, 378 N.E.2d 984 (1978); Orange
County Publications v. Council of Newburgh, 60 A.D.2d 409, 401 N.Y.S.2d 84, aff'd, 45 N.Y.2d
947, 383 N.E.2d 1157,411 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1978); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11120, 54953 (West 1983);
N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 100 (McKinney Supp. 1986); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17
(Vernon 1970 & Supp. 1986).
196. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11126 (West 1980); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-1506 (1981); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 39 § 23B (West 1985 & Supp. 1986); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 105, 108 (McKinney
Supp. 1987); TEX. REV. C1v. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17 § 2 (Vernon 1970 & Supp. 1987).
197. Register Div. of Freedom Newspapers v. Orange County, 158 Cal. App. 3d 893, 907-08,
205 Cal. Rptr. 92, 100 (1984) (exemptions are permissive not mandatory; disclosure not prohibited
but nondisclosure is permitted in certain circumstances); Daily Gazette Co. v. Town Bd. of Cobles-
kill, 111 Misc. 2d 303, 304,444 N.Y.S.2d 44-46 (1981) (exemption); Ghiglione, 376 Mass. at 72-73,
378 N.E.2d at 987 (closed sessions permitted). See also, Holden v. Bd. of Trustees of Cornell Univ.,
80 A.D.2d 378, 440 N.Y.S.2d 58 (1981) (Open Meetings Law to be given broad and liberal construc-
tion to achieve legislative purpose).
198. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11130.7 (West Supp. 1987); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 39 § 23B
(West 1985 & Supp. 1986); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17 § 4 (Vernon 1970 & Supp.
1987).
199. City of Abilene v. Shackelford, 572 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. App. 1978), rev'd on other grounds,
585 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. 1979).
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lenge violations of the Open Meetings Act. The appeals court held that
the press could not challenge an alleged violation of the Act because the
press was not an "interested person" within the meaning of the Act, since
the plaintiffs did not allege or prove that they suffered special injury as a
result of the meeting being closed.2°O Furthermore, the appeals court
stated that "representatives of the 'news media' have no constitutional or
other right of special access to information not available to the public
generally."20I
The Texas Open Meetings Act was amended in 1980 to provide that
an "interested person" included "bona fide members of the news me-
dia."202 Thus, the principal issue in Shackleford has been statutorily re-
solved. However, the interpretation of the amended provision has
resulted in litigation.
In Board of Trustees v. Cox Enterprises, Inc.,203 a newspaper
brought an action alleging violations of the Open Meetings Act by the
Austin School District Board of Trustees. The court interpreted the Act
to mean that the legislature intended to grant standing to members of the
news media without requiring a showing by them of a special interest
apart from that of the general public.204 Thus, the media have a right not
granted to the public.
Most open meeting statutes require that notice of meetings open to
the public be placed in a conspicuous place with strict requirements as to
content, location, date and time of such notice.205 In California, notice
of a special or emergency session is to be given at least 24 hours prior to
such session.206 Under California Government Code sections 11125.5
and 54956.5, which cover emergency and special sessions, members of
the local news media, print and broadcast, who request that notification
be given, are to be notified by the presiding officer of the public body or a
designated person, by telephone, at least one hour prior to the emergency
meeting.207 Closed sessions are not permitted if the meeting was called
pursuant to these code provisions.208 Notice is also required to be given
200. Id. at 747 (citations omitted).
201. Id.
202. TEX. REY. CIY. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17 § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
203. 679 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. App. 1984).
204. Id. at 88.
205. CAL. GOy'T CODE §§ 11125, 54954.1 (West 1983 & Supp. 1987) (which requires notice to
be mailed to property owners who request such notice); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 39 § 23B
(West 1985); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 104 (McKinney Supp. 1987) (which requires notice to be given
specifically to the news media to the extent practical).
206. CAL. GOy'T CODE §§ 11125.5, 54956, 54956.5 (West Supp. 1987).
207. Id.
208. "It would be a violation of the Ralph M. Brown Act (§ 54950 et seq.) for a member of a city
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when a public body meets in closed session.209 However, the notice re-
quirement of the Texas Open Meeting Act does not apply to meetings
not open to the public (e.g., executive sessions).210 The agenda and other
writings of the public meetings, but not closed sessions, are to be made
available to the public in California.211 Minutes may be kept, but are not
required and are not subject to disclosure.212
The extensive nature of the provisions of the open meetings statutes
of California, New York, Massachusetts and Texas indicate that these
states seek to insure that public meetings remain public. The statutes are
strictly construed so as to effectuate their purpose to keep the public in-
formed of the inner workings of a state's governmental bodies. However,
although the news media play a crucial role in keeping the public in-
formed, only Texas affords the media rights superior to those afforded
the general public.
VIII. OPEN RECORDS LEGISLATION
Like the open meetings legislation of the jurisdictions surveyed, the
open records legislation of these jurdictions is extensive. In each case,
however, the latter substantially mirrors the Federal Freedom of Infor-
mation Act.213 The primary policy basis for these statutes is the proposi-
tion that citizens have a right to know the processes of governmental
decision making.214 In California the policy of the Open Records Act is
also to insure individual privacy.215 Thus, the interests sought to be bal-
anced - the public's right to know against an individual's right to pri-
vacy in his affairs - are incorporated into the legislative provisions of
California's Open Records Act,216
The main issue presented when an open records act is challenged is
whether the records sought to be disclosed are "public records." Most
council to hold a series of closed discussions with citizens having matters of business pending before
them together or convey information regarding those matters where the discussions are held on
successive dates and are so planned to insure that a quorum of the council will not be present at any
given meeting." 65 Ops. Att'y Gen. 63 (1962).
209. CAL. GOy'T CODE §§ 11126.3, 54956.9 (West Supp. 1987).
210. Cox Enters.. 679 S.W.2d at 92.
211. CAL. GOy'T CODE §§ 11125.1,54957.5 (West 1983 & Supp. 1987).
212. Id. § 54957.2; Perryman v. School Comm. of Boston, 17 Mass. App. 348, 456 N.E.2d 748,
752 (1983).
213. Freedom of Information Act of 1967, Pub. L. 90-23, § 552, 81 Stat. 54 (1967).
214. CAL. GOY'T CODE §§ 6250, 9070 (West 1980); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-1521 (1978); MASS.
GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 66 § lO(b) (West 1986); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 84 (McKinney Supp. 1987);
TEX. REY. ClY. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a (Vernon Supp. 1987).
215. CAL. GOy'T CODE § 6250 (West 1980).
216. Id. § 6255.
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statutes define the term "public records."217 Statutory silence or ambigu-
ity regarding the definition of "public" is clarified by the case law of each
jurisdiction. In California, the definition of public record is expanded by
case law to cover "every conceivable kind of record that is involved in
the governmental process and . . . any form of record keeping instru-
ments as it is developed. Only purely personal information unrelated to
the conduct of the public's business is exempt."218 These statutes pro-
vide for written guidelines on accessibility,219 in addition to delineating
which records are public.220
New York is unique among the jurisdictions surveyed in that its
Open Records Act establishes a committee, which is to include at least
two representatives of the news media, to furnish any agency or person
with advisory opinions, guidelines or other appropriate information re-
garding the Act and to promulgate rules and regulations regarding im-
plementation of the Act.22J
Analogous to the open meetings legislation, the open records legisla-
tion provides that certain enumerated records are not public and are,
therefore, exempt from disclosure.222 The public policy of each of the
jurisdictions surveyed favors disclosure. The exemptions are narrowly
construed to effectuate this policy.223 Moreover, since there is a statu-
tory pr~sumption favoring disclosure, the burden falls on the person
claiming an exemption to prove entitlement to that exemption.224
217. CAL. GOy'T CODE § 6252(d) (West 1980); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-1152 (1978); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 66 § 3 (West 1969); N.Y.' PUB. OFF. LAW § 86.4 (McKinney Supp. 1987);
TEX. REY. CIY. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a § 2(2) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
218. San Gabriel Tribune v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App. 3d 762, 774,192 Cal. Rptr. 415, 422
(1983) (quoting 58 Ops. Cal. Att'y Gen. 629, 633-34 (1975».
219. CAL. GOy'T CODE § 6253 (West Supp. 1987); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-1522 (1978); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 66, § 10 (1851) (amended 1982); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 86-88 (McKinney
Supp. 1987); TEX. REY. CIY. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a §§ 4,5 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
220. CAL. GOy'T CODE § 6254.7, 6254.8 (West 1980 & Supp. 1987); D. C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-
1526 (1978); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 66, § 10 (West 1980); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 89 (McKin-
ney Supp. 1987); TEX. REY. CIY. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a § 6 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
221. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 89 (McKinney Supp. 1987).
222. CAL. GOy'T CODE § 6254 (West 1981) (amended 1984); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-5424
(\981); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 4, § 7, (West 1986); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 87 (McKinney
Supp. 1987); TEX. REY. CIY. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a (Vernon Supp. 1987).
223. San Gabriel Tribune, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 779, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 426; Attorney Gen. v.
Assistant Comm'r of the Real Property Dept. of Boston, 380 Mass. 623, 404 N.E.2d 1254, 1255
(\980); Washington Post Co. v. New York State Ins. Dept., 114 Misc. 2d 601, 452 N.Y.S.2d 163,
rev 'd. 94 A.D.2d 648, 462 N.Y.S.2d 208, rev'd, 61 N.Y.S.2d 557, 263 N.E.2d 604, 475 N.Y.S.2d 263
(1984); Heard v. Houston Post Co., 684 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
224. San Gabriel Tribune. 143 Cal. App.3d at 779, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 426; Attorney Gen. v.
Assistant Comm'r of the Real Property Dept. of Boston, 380 Mass. 623, 404 N.E.2d 1254 (1980);
Westchester Rockland Newspapers, Inc., v. Kimball, 50 N.Y.2d 575, 408 N.E.2d 904, 430 N.Y.S.2d
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As previously indicated, there are competing interests to be served
where disclosure is sought. The courts seek to balance the public's need
for the information at issue and the individual's right to privacyp5
None of the statutes surveyed requires the disclosure of records, if such
disclosure would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy.226
In Massachusetts the right to know prevails, unless disclosure would
publicize "intimate details of a highly personal nature."227 An unwar-
ranted invasion of privacy in Texas is defined as disclosure of that
"(1) which contains information highly objectionable to a reasonable per-
son and (2) is not of legitimate concern to the public."228 This is the
same standard applicable to an invasion of privacy action for public dis-
closure of private facts. 229
At least two jurisdictions have held that the right to access is af-
forded to the general public, including the media.230 However, the media
have failed in their attempts to obtain greater access to records than that
afforded the general public.231
In each jurisdiction, if an agency denies access to the requested
records on the basis that they are exempt, it must follow strict guidelines
detailing specific reasons why the records fit within the exemption
claimed.232 In Texas and Massachusetts, the Attorney General is re-
quired to make an independent determination whether disclosure is re-
574 (1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 66, § lO(c) (West Supp. 1986); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 66,
89(5)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
225. In re National Broadcasting Co., 653 F.2d 609 (D.D.C 1981); Hastings and Sons Publishing
Co. v. City Treasurer of Lynn, 374 Mass. 812, 375 N.E.2d 299 (1978); Teachers Pension Ass'n v.
Teachers Retirement System of the City of New York, 98 Misc. 2d 1118,415 N.Y.S.2d 561, aff'd. 71
A.D.2d 250, 422 N.Y.S.2d 389 (1979); Hubert v. Harte-Hanks Texas Newspapers, Inc., 652 S.W.2d
546 at 550 (Tex. ApI'. 3 Dist. 1983).
226. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6254(c) (West 1980); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1.1524(a)(3)(C) (1981);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 14, § 7 (West 1986); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 87 (McKinney Supp.
1987) (which enumerates specific disclosures that would constitute unwarranted invasions of pri-
vacy); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17(a) § 3(a)(9) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
227. Assistant Comm'r ofthe Real Property Dept ofBoston, 380 Mass. at 623, 404 N.E.2d at 1256
(quoting Attorney Gen. v. Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. lSI, 385 N.E.2d 505 (1979».
228. Hubert. 652 S.W.2d at 550 (quoting Indus. Found. of the South v. Texas Indus. Accident
Bd., 540, S.W.2d 668, 685 (Tex. 1976) cert. denied. 430 U.S. 931 (1977».
229. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text. See also. Pottle v. School Comm. of Brain-
tree, 395 Mass. 861, 482 N.E.2d 813 (1985).
230. In re Estate of Hearst, 67 Cal. ApI'. 3d 777, 782 136 Cal. Rptr. 821, 823 (1977); Texas
Indus. Accident Bd. v. Indus. Found., 526 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. ApI'. 1975) cert. denied. 430 U.S. 931
(1977).
231. In re Estate of Hearst, 67 Cal. ApI'. 3d at 785, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 826; see also Heard v. The
Houston Post Co., 684 S.W.2d 210, 213 (Tex. ApI" 1984).
232. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6256 (West 1980 & Supp. 1987); D.C. CODE ANN. ch. 66 §§ 1-1524
(1981); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 89(3) (McKinney Supp. 1987); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
6252-17a, § 7 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
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quired before the court may do so, when the custodian of agency records
denies access.233
In City ofHouston v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 234 the court
had occasion to interpret the Texas Open Records Act. The court con-
cluded that the Act required a decision from the Attorney General if
"(I) the City considers the information to be within one of the statutory
exceptions to disclosure, and (2) there has been no previous determina-
tion as to the status of the information.235 Consequently, the court re-
quired disclosure because the courts had previously determined the
information sought by the Houston Chronicle to be public.
Although each jurisdiction has enacted its own open records act, the
provisions of each are similar in most respects. Likewise, the cases are in
agreement as to the interpretation of these statutes. Disclosure is favored
unless the records fall within a strictly defined exception or the interests
in nondisclosure far outweigh those in disclosure.
IX. CONCLUSION
State courts and legislatures make a great many decisions regarding
laws that impact directly upon the day-to-day operations of the print and
broadcast media. For most of the topics examined in this article, there
are distinctions among the laws of the jurisdictions surveyed. These dis-
tinctions simply reflect the differing results of the same interest-balancing
processes carried out by different courts and legislatures. Such distinc-
tions as there are would not appear readily explicable in terms of regional
or general historical differences among the jurisdictions.
On the other hand, the clear and dominant similarities in the laws of
the various jurisdictions result from the fact that, in these matters, one
side of the interest-balancing scale is always occupied by the first amend-
ment, and the Supreme Court has established clear, though not rigid,
standards by which allegedly infringing laws are tested.
Among the first amendment issues the Supreme Court has not yet
resolved is the question whether the media should enjoy greater rights
than those afforded the general public. Those who believe the media are
essentially agents of the public and that "press rights" are, at best, deriv-
ative, may be inclined to answer emphatically "no."
But the agency notion and the practical realities of modern telecom-
munications technology suggest that the public's effective right to know
233. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 66, § IO(b) (West Supp. 1986); TEX. REV. elV. STAT. ANN.
art. 6252-17a, § 7 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
234. 673 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) ("Chronicle II").
235. [d. at 318.
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is only as great as the media's right to access. Thus, special protection
for the media is, in fact, simply a means (probably the only effective
means) of insuring meaningful protection for the rights of the general
public.
